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As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR MARCH.
A sleeping-car company is liable as a common carrier for
the preservation of a passenger's baggage while entrusted to
Bailment, its porter to be taken from the car to the waiting-
Sleeping-car room of the depot, in accordance with a rule of
Company,
Liability for the company: Voss v. Cleveland, C., C. & St.
Baggage L. Ry. Co., (Appellate Court of Indiana,) 43 N.
E. Rep. 20.
The Young Men's Christian Association is not a public
charitable corporation, within the rule exempting such cor-
Charitable porations from liability for negligence, since its
Associations, purposes are social as well as charitable, including
Liability for
Negligence, the giving of lectures and other entertainments for
Young Alen's the benefit of its members, the providing of a
Christian
Association gymnasium to promote their health, and the sale
of food at a lunch counter; and it is, therefore, not exempt
from liability for negligence in the construction of a floor in
its building by which one on the premises at its invitation is
injured: Chapin v. Holyoke Young lien's Clristian Assn.,
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 42 N. E. Rep.
1130.
The Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Vest-
ern District, recently, in Shaver v. Penna. Co., 71 Fed. Rep.
Constitutional 93 1, after deciding, in accordance with the weight
Law, of authority, that the contract of membership in a
Liberty of
Contract, railway relief department is valid, went on to hold
Railway that the statute of Ohio, (87 Ohio Laws, p. 149,)
Relief
Fund which provides that no railroad company, insur-
ance company, or association of other persons, shall require
any agreement or stipulation with any other person, in or
about to enter the employment of a railroad company, whereby
such person agrees to waive any right to damages from such
256
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railroad company for personal injuries, or any other right
whatever, and all such agreements and stipulations shall be
void, is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, by de-
priving the persons affected by it of their liberty of contract,
without due process of law; and also of the Constitution of
Ohio, Art. 2, § 26, which provides that all laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State,
since the statute is class legislation, affecting only railroad
employes.
The latter objection may, perhaps, be valid: the former
certainly is not. Theoretically, the railroad employe may in
some cases be free to join the relief department or not, as he
chooses; but practically in all cases, and expressly in many,
-he is coerced to join it, his dues being frequently deducted by
the company from his wages, and paid over to the department
by it, so that it would be hard to find'a greater self-contra-
diction than the claim that an act which is designed to free
the employe from this coercion deprives him of his liberty of
contract.
The Supreme Court of the United States, following its
former decisions, has lately held, that if a State exercises its
Obligation power to repeal a grant of authority to its courts
of Contract, to audit claims against itself, it does not thereby
Claims
against violate the obligation of a contract entered into by
State it at a time when the power existed ; and that no
impairment of the obligation of a contract arises from the fact
that the State court erroneously decided that an amendment
to the State Constitution repealed the court's authority to
examine and recommend a claim against the State presented
to it : Baltzer v. AXortlz Carolina, i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500.
A contract for the sale of several lots of land, of unequal
value, to several subscribers, which provides that the sub-
Contracts, scribers shall meet, and determine "by lot" the
Invalidity, particular lot to be deeded to each subscriber,
Publie Policy,
Lottery and stipulates that a certain lot, which had been
reserved as a "prize" lot, is to be "given away" and
"' awarded " to some one of the subscribers in like manner, is
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void, as against public policy: Lynch v. Rosenthal, (Supreme
Court of Indiana,) 42 N. E. Rep. 1 ;03.
In Exchange Telegraph Company, Ltd., v. Gregoriy & Co.
[1896] I Q. B. 147, the Court of Appeal of England has
Copyright, lately held that where, under a contract between
Injunction,
Unpublished a news agency and the committee of a stock
Information exchange, valuable information as to the prices of
stocks and shares from time to time during the day was
collected on the stock exchange, and supplied to the agency,
and printed on tapes and sheets of letter-press in their office;
and the defendant, having surreptitiously obtained that inform-
ation, published it in the same form before its publication by
the agency; that the agency had a right of property at
Common Law in the information, and were entitled to an
injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing that right
by continuing to publish it.
Judge Toney, of the Jefferson Circuit Court of Kentucky,
has laid down in a recent case before him (Kcntncky A1atl. Bk.
Corporations, v. Aveyj,) some useful general principles of law
Stock with regard to the rights of a purchaser of stock
Certificates, . ot
Neglect to in open market, who neglects to have the transfer
Register to him properly registered against prior and sub-Transfer,
Rights of sequent attaching creditors of the vendor. He
Purchaser
Against holds:
Creditor (i) That a purchaser in open market of cer-
tificates of stock in a private corporation, who omits or neg-
lects to have the transfer of said stock duly registered on the
corporate books, acquires the legal title and a better equity to
said stock than an attachment creditor of the vendor has or
acquires by a subsequent levy of attachment on said stock;
(2) That an innocent purchaser in open market of certifi-
cates of stock for value and without notice is not protected in
his ownership in such stock against an antecedent attachment
or execution against his vendor, which, previous to said pur-
chase of said stock, had been levied by service of the process
of attachment orfi..fa. on the proper officers or agents of the
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corporation in the manner prescribed by the statute for effect-
ing a levy on stock.
The Supreme Court of Vermont has lately ruled, in accord-
ance with the weight of authority, that one who steals
CriminalLaw, property in a foreign country, and brings it into
Larceny In this, is guilty of larceny here, on the ground that
Foreign
Country as the legal possession remains in the owner when
the first taking is felonious, every asportation of the property
is a fresh taking; and that on a prosecution for such an offence
the courts will presume the laws of the foreign country to be
the same as our own, and that the original taking there was
criminal, upon proof of acts which would make it criminal
here: State v. JTorrill, (Supreme Court of Vermont,) 33 Atl.
Rep. 1070.
The Queen's Bench Division of England has recently held
that a seagull, kept by a photographer for the purposes of her
Cruelty to business, and so tame that it would go to its owner
Animals, when called and feed from her hand, was not a
"'Domestic
Animals " "domestic animal," within the Cruelty to Animals
Act of 1849, (12 & 13 Vict. c. 92): Yates v. Higgins, [1896]
I Q. B. 166.
It has been lately decided by the Supreme Court of Missis-
Death, sippi that the statutory presumption of death 
from
Presumption absence or concealment for seven years, without
from Absence, having been heard from, does not apply to chil-
Infants , dren of tender age, incapable of absenting or con-
cealing themselves of their own volition, and whose movements
are governed by others: _71anley v. Patterson, 19 So. Rep. 236.
In the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
Death by a recovery by the personal representative of a
WrongfulAct, wife whose death resulted from injuries caused
Husband's
Right of by the negligence of a railroad company or its
Recovery for
Loss of Wifes .employes, bars an action by the husband to recover
Society damages for loss of the wife's society from the
time the injuries were inflicted until her death: Louisville &
".. R. R. Co. v. Jlwain, 34 S. IV. Rep. 236.
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The Court of Appeal of Ireland has recently held, that when
the owner of a deposit receipt, in good bodily health, gives it
Donatio to another under circumstances such that the
Mortis Causa, jury find it to have been given in contemplation
Deposit
Receipt, of death by suicide, and that the gift was to take
Suicide effect only in the event of the donor's death, it is
not a good donatio mnorris causa : Agneac v. Bclfast Bkg. Co.,
[1896] 2 I. R. 204.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey, when two tenants in common, by quitclaim deeds
Easement, simultaneously interchanged, sever a lot held by
Appurtenant, them, on which a store is situated, into two tracts,
Light and Air the owner of the bare lot cannot close a window
of the store through which light and air are received from his
lot, if the influx thereof is reasonably necessary to the benefi-
cial enjoyment of the store ; for, because of the apparent and
continuous quality of this enjoyment of light and air, the right
to them will become an easement appurtenant to the store, on
severance of the title to that from the title to the adjoining
property; Grce v. Ian Jctc-, 33 Atl. Rep. 794.
The Supreme Court of Mlichigan has lately held, that under
the provisions of the Ballot Law of that State, (Sess. L. 1891,
Elections, Art. 190, §§ 21, 31,) that no person shall be
Fraud allowed within the railing of an election room
except to vote, or to assist an elector, as thereinafter provided,
but that in case of necessity an interpreter may be employed,
when, at a county election, an interpreter hostile t, one of the
candidates was allowed within the railing of the polling place,
and was permitted to converse fi'eely with foreigners who only
understood their own language, after they had been admitted
to vote, although they had n,)t applied for an interpreter, the
vote of the entire township should be excluded, if its exclusion
would change the result of the election: 3Jlzaird v. Stillson,
66 N. V. Rep. 388.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has taken a common
26o
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sense view of the Australian Ballot Laws, and given them a
Ballots, remedial and liberal interpretation. Under its
Marking ballot law, which is perhaps even more perempt-
ory, in its terms than some of those that have been- held
mandatory, it holds that the provisions for marking ballots are
directory; and that, therefore, in the first instance, a lead
pencil mark, instead of one made with the stencil, as required
by law, will not invalidate the ballot, in the absence of fraud.
It further holds that a solid, irregular figure, evidently caused
by mismanagement of the stencil, is a sufficient mark; that
a mark consisting of two down strokes and one horizontal
stroke is sufficient; that the use of three cross marks in a
square will not vitiate the ballot; that a cross just outside the
square containing the part), device, is a vote for all the
candidates of that party, but that a cross mark after the
name of the first candidate of the party, is a vote for
that candidate only, not for the whole party; that, since the
act provides that when a cross mark is made in the square
containing the party device, and a cross mark in the square
after the name of a candidate of a different party, the vote
shall be counted for the latter, a ballot which has a cross mark
in the square containing a party device, and also a mark
immediately across the top of the square after the name of a
candidate of the opposite party, should be counted a vote for
that candidate; and that ordinary ink blots and pencil check
marks,, which appear to have been accidentally placed on
a ballot, will not invalidate it, on the ground that they are
distinguishing marks: Houston v. Steele, 34 S. V. Rep. 6.
An officer of a corporation, who converts to his own use a
-note of the corporation, made payable to his order, before it is
Embezzle. issued by the corporation, is not guilty of embez-
ment zlina " an- evidence of debt, negotiable by delivery
by Officer Z eb
of Corpora- only," since such a note is negotiable by indorse-
tion, ment; or of embezzling "any money goods
Note of $ or o e an m
Corporation rights in action, or valuable security or effects
whatsoever," since this note, " so long as it remained in the
]hands of the defendant, its lawful custodian, not delivered or
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issued, represented no value whatever": State v. Stebbins,
(Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2,) 3 3 S.W. Rep. I 147.
The Queen's Bench Division of England has recently held,
that even when an extradition treaty expressly provides that
Extradition, neither nation "shall be bound to surrender their
Surrender own subjects, whether by birth or naturalization,"
of Own
Subjects, , yet, if the committing magistrate sees proper, he
Poierng may grant the extradition of a natural-bornCommittingma
Magistrate citizen for an extraditable offence committed in tie
other country; and that it is not necessary that in such case
the surrender should be the result of negotiations between the
respective governments and an express consent to the extradition
by the home government : -i re Ga/way, [1896] 1 Q. B. 230.
In Di/azc'ay v. A/dc"z, 33 Atl. Rep. 981, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine has rendered a very peculiar decision
in regard to the gambling aspect of transactions
Gambling
Contracts, in the stock-market. The general rule, as hitherto
Stock- laid down, has been, that if the parties settle their
broking accounts on the basis of difference in price, the
transaction is a gambling one. This rule is qualified in the
present case by holding that it prevails only when neither
party expects any delivery at any time; and that no matter
how intermediate balances are settled, if the final balance is
settled by a delivery of stock, the transaction is valid in otao.
Accordingly, although in the case in hand there were numerous
dealings with reference to fluctuation in price, yet, as the broker
always kept command of sufficient actual stock to make de-
livery when demanded, and, at the end of the last deal, did
transfer the remaining stock to his customer's order, the trans-
action was valid.
The House of Lords has lately ruled, (i) That when the
goodwill of a business is sold without any qualification, the
vendor may set up a rival business, but has noGoodwill,
Sale, right to expressly solicit the customers of the old
Soliciting old firm; and he may be restrained by injunction from
Customers 3
soliciting any person who was a customer of the
old firm, prior to the sale, to continue to deal with himself, or
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
not to deal with the purchaser; and (2) That the same prin-
ciples apply to a case where a person has been taken into
partnership on the terms that on the expiration of the partner-
ship the goodwill of the business shall belong solely to the
other partner: Trego v. Hunt, [1896] A. C. 7; reversing
[895] I Ch. 462, overruling the reasoning in Pea-son v.
Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145 (1884), and approving Labouclhcre v.
Dawson, 13 L. R. Eq. 322 (1872).
There is an annotation on this subject,-in 33 A.t. L. REG.
& REV. N. S. 216.
In .TIAneilley v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 43
N. E. Rep. 54, the Court of Appeals of New York has lately
Insurance, decided, (I) That a provision of an accident policy
Accident, that it does not insure against death or disable-
Inhaling Gas ment" arising from anything accidentally taken,
administered, or inhaled, contact of poisonous substances,
inhaling gas, or any surgical operation," does not relieve the
insurer from liability for death caused by inhaling illuminating
gas which accidentally escaped into a hotel room where the
insured was sleeping, since that provision clearly refers to a
voluntary and intelligent act of the insured, not to an involun-
tary and unconscious act; and (2) That death from such a
cause is not within the clause of an insurance policy which
provides that it does not insure against death or disablement
"from accidents that shall bear no external and visible
marks," if it appears that, though there were no visible marks
of accident on the body of the deceased, illuminating gas
emanated therefrom when artificial respiration was produced.
The first ruling follows the precedent set in Paul v. Tra-,-
elers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472 (1889), and Pickctt v. Pacific Jl/ut.
Life Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79 (I89i), the latter of which was a case
of death from inhaling poisonous gas at the bottom of a well.
A surety on a bond of fidelity insurance, to indemnify a
corporation against loss of money entrusted to its treasurer
Fidelity through the "embezzlement or larceny " thereof
Insurance, by the latter, is not liable for money entrusted to
Liability on
Bond him, for which he failed to account, and on which
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the corporation charged him interest, while it was in his hands.
The surety does not contract to pay the debts of the employe
insured, but only " to reimburse the employer for pecuniary
loss resulting from embezzlement or larceny:" Milwaukee
Theatre Co. x-. Fidelit, & Casualt, Co., (Supreme Court of
Wisconsin,) 66 N. IN. Rep. 36o.
When a lodge of an order which is social as well as bene-
ficial, is disbanded, and the transfer card of a member is
Alutual refused by the other local lodge, that member is
Benefit not obliged to transfer his membership to a foreign
Society,
Transfer of lodge, but may send his assessments to the
Membership supreme council; and will not forfeit his rights as
a member of the order by so doing: Starling v. Supreme
Council Royal Templars qf Temperance, (Supreme Court of
Michigan,) 66 N. 1,V. Rep. 340.
The members of an association formed to aid in the prosecu-
tion of a particular class of offences, and those who are in
Jurors, sympathy with the association, and contribute
Competency money for the purposes of its organization, are
not competent to sit as jurors on the trial of an indictment for
an offence of the class for the prosecution of which the associa-
tion is formed and the money contributed: State v. iMfoore,
(Supreme Court of Louisiana,) 19 So. Rep. 285.
The Court of Appeal of Ireland has recently decided a very
curious case: ElaH of Pemnbi-oke v. Warren, [1896] I I. R. 76.
Lease, The lease of a plot of ground on one side of Fitz-
Covenant not william Square, in the city of Dublin, made in
to carry on
,. Offensive 1822, when the square was only partly built, con-
Business," tained covenants by the lessee to build dwelling-
Private b wlia
Hospital houses of a superior class according to the descrip-
tions in the lease, and that the ground called Fitzwilliam
Square should be preserved as a square and laid out as a
pleasure ground only. It also contained a covenant not to
use any part of the front of the house as a shop, or carry on
therein or on any part of the demised premises the business
of a tavern, ale-house, soap-boiler, chandler, baker, butcher,
distiller, sugar-baker, brewer, druggist, apothecary, tanner,
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skinner, lime-burner, hatter, silversmith, coppersmith, pew-
terer, blacksmith, or any other offensive or noisy trade, busi-
ness, or profession whatsoever. A sub-lessee thereafter opened
what the plaintiff called a private or home hospital, but what
she described as a residence for herself and persons coming to
town for medical advice or to undergo treatment. On a
motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain this as a
breach of the covenant, evidence was given that such a busi-
ness would cause great annoyance and would be a source of
danger to the other inhabitants of the square, and would
greatly depreciate the value of the property. The evidence
for the defendant went to show that the only persons admitted
were patients requiring surgical operations or medical treat-
ment, and who were sent by their own medical or surgical
advisers; that persons suffering from infectious diseases were
not received, and that there was no danger from infection.
Upon this evidence, it was held by the Vice-Chancellor and
affirmed by the Court of Appeal, (FitzGibbon, L. J., dissent-
ing,) that the rule of ejusdem generis did not apply to the
covenant mentioned above, and therefore its concluding general
words were not to be confined to businesses of a nature similar
to those enumerated; that in construing the covenant the
nature and purpose of the letting and the nature of the
locality should be taken into account; that the word "offen-
sive " had no definite legal meaning, that it was not to be
restricted to what was unpleasant to the eye, ear or nose, that
it should be interpreted according to the subject-matter, and
that it meant in this case causing well-founded and reasonable
annoyance; and therefore, as the evidence showed that the
great body of the tenants of houses in the square were offended
by the opening of the hospital, there had been a breach of the
covenant which should be restrained by an interlocutory injunc-
tion.
In Dowling v. Livingstone, 66 N. W. Rep. 225, the Supreme
Court of Michigan has pretty thoroughly treated the subject
of libel in a book review. The general propositionsLibel,
Book Review, maintained are as follows: (i) That when there is
Criticism no misstatement of facts or of the propositions set
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forth in a book under review by a newspaper critic, it is not
libelous for him to ridicule and discuss with sarcasm the
theories of the author; and (2) That in an action for an alleged
libelous review of a book, it is error to charge that the defend-
ant had the right to ridicule the book if, in the candid judg-
ment of any fair man, the book deserved ridicule, since the
critic himself is the judge of the .language of his criticism.
The particular matters of libel urged are even more comic
than the theories criticized ; and it was hardly worth the
court's while to mention them seriatim. But it decided
specifically (i) That when an author quotes from another a
paragraph enclosed in quotation marks, but not credited by
name, a statement by a reviewer that the author has quoted
another without giving him credit does not charge him with
plagiarism; (2) That when a reviewer writes, ' of course, like
all quack remedies, it would intensify the trouble," he does
not characterize the author of the book under review as a
quack; (3) That it is not libelous for a reviewer to write of
one of the author's views that Horace Greeley advocated the
same doctrine, though it should appear that such was not the
case, (a claim which is particularly absurd;) and (4) That
when an author, in discussing Mr. Henry George's proposition
to take the land from its present owners without compensation,
denounces it as " a gigantic piece of robbery," it is not libelous
for a reviewer to write that the author " denounces the single-
tax scheme as robbery." (Here again one wonders why, in
the name of common-sense, such a statement was claimed to
be libelous. It would be far more so if the critic had charged
him with approving it.)
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Diarland v.
United States, i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5o8, has lately decided, that
lails, under the Act of 1889, March 2, amending Rev.
Improper Stat. U. S. § 5480, which provides that if any
Use,
Scheme to person, having devised or intending to devise any
Defraud scheme or artifice to defraud by correspondence
through the mails, shall, in executing such scheme, place any
letter or circular in the post-office, he shall be liable to pro-
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-ecution, it is not necessary, in order to constitute the offence
denounced, that the letters deposited in the post-office by the
defendant should be such as would be effective in carrying
out his fraudulent scheme; and accordingly, the fact that a
communication placed in the mails by the promoter of a
fraudulent investment company contained merely statements
as to the future profits which would accrue to investors, and
not misrepresentations as to existing facts, did not affect his
liability.
The House of Lords has recently construed the clause of
the Employers' Liability Act of i88o, (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42,
Master and p. i, subs. 5,) which provides that when personal
Servant, injury is caused to a workman by reason of the
Negligence,
Statutory negligence of any person in the service of the
Liability for employer " who has the charge or control of any
Acts of
Fellow- . . locomotive engine or train upon a railway,"
servant there shall be the same right of compensation
against the employer as if the workman had not been in his
service. In the case in question, an engineer, employed with
his fireman in the discharge of loaded cars on a railroad, took
an engine and several cars to a point on an incline where the
grade was steep, and then went on with the engine and one of
the cars to the place of discharge, intending to return for the
other cars in due course of time. The fireman uncoupled the
cars left behind, and blocked the wheels with slag, as was
usually done, to prevent them from running down the incline;
but one of them broke away, ran down the incline, and killed
a workman in the service of the same employer. There was
evidence that the mode of blocking the wheels adopted was
unsafe, and that it was known to and approved by the
engineer. Upon this state of facts the court held,
(i) That a "person who has charge or control of a train"
does not necessarily cease to have charge of it, within the
meaning of the Act, because some of the cars are uncoupled
from one another, and from the engine, in order to shift them
separately; and that those words do not necessarily point to
one person who is in charge of the whole train, but may
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include persons who have duties to perform in respect of parts
of the train ; and
(2) That in the case in hand, there was evidence for the
jury that the death of the deceased was caused by reason of
the negligence of a person who had the charge or control of
a train within the meaning of the Act, since either the engineer
had the charge or control, or else the fireman had, and there
was evidence of negligence on the part of both: JlcCord v.
Caunzcll & Co., Ltd., [1896] A. C. 57.
According to a recent decision of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council of England, the statutory grant to a
M unicipal municipal corporation of the power to make ordi-
Corporations, nances for regulating and governing a trade does
Ordinance,
Prohibition not, in the absence of an express power of pro-
of Lawful hibition, authorize the corporation to make it
Trade unlawful to carry on a lawful trade in a lawful
manner; and therefore an ordinance prohibiting peddlers from
plying their trade in an important part of the municipality is
invalid, when no question of an apprehended nuisance has
been raised: Xhtnicipal Corporation of Cit , of Toronto v. Tr1o,
[1896] A. C. 88, affirming 22 Can. Sup. Ct. Rep. 447.
The Court of Appeal of England, in Smith v. South Eastern
Ry. Co., [1896] I Q. B. 178, has lately rendered a decision
Negligence, which shows how far the administration of justice
Railroad in that country is superior to that in most of the
Crossing,
Safety United States. The facts were as follows : There
Gates was a gatekeeper's lodge near the crossing
where the plaintiff's husband was killed, at which a servant of
the company was stationed, whose duty it was, under the
regulations of the company, to attend to the carriage gates at
the crossing, and, whenever a train was approaching, to stand
by the rails, and, if the line was clear, show a white flag by
day or a white light at night. There were lamps on the car-
riage gates which showed a white light when closed across
the highway, and a red light when closed across the line. The
deceased, who lived near the crossing on the other side of the
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line, called at the gatekeeper's lodge between eight and nine
o'clock one night in December to inquire whether his wife was
there, and found the gatekeeper sitting in his lodge reading.
On being told that his wife was not there, be left the lodge.
The approach of a train had been signalled by the bell on the
lodge, before the deceased entered, but the gatekeeper gave
him no warning, and did not go out to signal the train. The
deceased attempted to cross the tracks, but was caught by the
train and killed. The train carried lights which were visible
by any one about to cross at that crossing for a distance of
more than six hundred yards; and the engineer whistled ten
seconds before the train passed over the crossing, which it did
at a speed of from thirty-five to forty miles an hour. The
engineer stated that when approaching the crossing, he saw
the white light on the carriage gate, which showed that they
were closed across the highway, but that he did not rereive
any hand signal from the gatekeeper. Upon this state of facts
the court ruled that there was evidence for the jury that the
accident was due to the negligence of the company, and not
to the fault of the deceased, and that the trial judge was there-
fore right in not withdrawing the case from the jury; Kay,
L. J., saying: "The default of the gatekeeper could not be
denied. It was said that his duty had no relation to persons
passing on foot, It seems to me that, when placed as he
was, with the duty of signalling that the line is clear, this pre-
caution is taken as much for the safety of foot-passengers as
for that of carriages or of the train. At any rate, I think the
jury would have a right to draw the inference that this was
so." If this case had come before most American courts, the
zeal with which they would have insisted on the doctrine of
contributory negligence would have been interesting.
The grant of power to appoint to a public office, when no
term of office is fixed by law, carries with it as an incident
the absolute power of removal at any time, with-
Officers,
Appointment, out notice or charges or hearing, and without the
Removal cause for removal being inquired into by any court.
Such power, when vested in a board, cannot be limited by any
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
action taken by the board, whether by appointing the officer
for a fixed term, or by by-laws restricting the power of removal
to cases where cause for removal exists: State v. Archibald,
(Supreme Court of North Dakota,) 66 N. W. Rep. 234.
The Appellate Court of Indiana has laid down several very
interesting rules of law in regard to the liability of a telephone
Telephone company for damages caused by its failure to
Companies, notify a person called that he was wanted, holding,
Public
Stations, (i) That it is the duty of a telephone company
Notifying which maintains a line between different cities
Patrons and towns, with stations in such towns for the use
of the public on payment of tolls, to furnish a suitable mes-
senger service for the purpose of notifying persons, within a
reasonable distance, when its patrons at other stations desire
to communicate with them ; and that it is responsible, within
proper limits, for the neglect or omission of these messengers;
(2) That though a telephone company has the right to
adopt reasonable rules, a regulation that it will not be re-
sponsible for the negligence of messengers sent from its
stations, who are necessarily selected by it and under its con-
trol, but that they shall be deemed the agents of thepatron at
whose instance they are sent, is void; and
(3) That when, by reason of the delay of a telephone com-
pany in calling a veterinary surgeon to its station, as it under-
took to do, he lost several hours in reaching a horse which
he was called to attend, and the animal died in the meantime,
the value of the horse cannot be considered as an element of
damages in an action by its owner against the telephone com-
pany for negligence in failing to sooner place him in commu-
nication with the surgeon ; the question as to whether the
horse would have been saved had the messenger taken the
call at once being entirely a matter of speculation : Central
Union Tel. Co. v. Swoveland, 42 N. E. Rep. 1035.
Ardemits Ste-wart.
